We examine the link between the competitiveness of the local banking market, urban development, and crime. We provide micro-level evidence that neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to future reduced loan provision, diminished local construction, lower prices and rents, an influx of poorer households, and higher crime in subsequent years. A one standard deviation increase in bank concentration raises homicide and burglary rates by approximately 1 percent. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.
Introduction
We propose and document a link between the competitiveness of the local banking market, urban development, and crime. Several recent studies (Peek and Rosengren (2000) , Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) , Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) , and Burgess and Pande (2003) ) tie credit market imperfections to diminished real economic activity and growth. Other studies examine the connection between the economic environment and crime (Freeman (1996) , Grogger (1998) , and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) ). It is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that reductions in bank competition may lead to economic decline and, subsequently, increases in crime. We empirically investigate the effects of bank consolidation and increased market power on credit availability and real activity in U.S. commercial real estate markets in the 1990's. We provide micro-level evidence that neighborhoods that experienced greater reductions in bank competition due to bank mergers are subjected to future reduced loan provision, diminished local construction, lower real estate prices and rents, and an influx of poorer households. We then examine whether these effects impact the social environment by examining subsequent changes in crime rates across neighborhoods, and find an associated increase in crime. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation since, among other evidence, we find that while bank mergers precede future crime increases, crime does not precede bank mergers, nor are the two contemporaneously correlated.
Our empirical strategy employs bank mergers to capture exogenous changes in the competitiveness of the local banking market. We consider only variation in banking market competitiveness through mergers of non-failing commercial banks (not bank holding companies) at the neighborhood level controlling for county effects. We then analyze the local market effects of mergers on subsequent loan rates and prices, investment activity, economic and demographic variables, and crime. It is worth emphasizing at the outset that we examine the relation between bank mergers and changes in economic conditions and crime across neighborhoods. Bank competition cannot explain the aggregate national decline in crime over the last few decades nor differences in the level of crime across regions. Indeed, we control for both the time trend and variation in crime levels across neighborhoods in our analysis.
The market for small commercial real estate loans is localized due to information considerations (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003a) ), so merger-induced changes in the local competitive environment can have sizeable effects. We find that when bank competition declines (via mergers), interest rates charged on loans rise slightly and borrowers are substantially less likely to obtain financing from banks. 1 Commercial real estate development, which is often a marginal investment for banks, and new construction activity also fall significantly. In addition, local property prices and rents decline. Examining local demographic and migration data from the Census, we then find that unemployment rises, per capita income drops, and income inequality increases. Moreover, the income of new arrivals into the neighborhood is below that of long-term residents, suggesting an exodus of higher-income households in response to the local decline in property values and rents.
Local racial composition also changes. These changing economic and demographic characteristics provide a plausible channel through which crime rates rise.
A one standard deviation increase in banking concentration in our sample increases subsequent homicide and burglary rates by approximately 1 percent. Applying our results to national crime figures from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, the mean decline in banking competitiveness from 1992 to 1995 that we document is associated with approximately 170 more homicides and 24,000 more burglaries per year from 1995 to 2000 across the U.S.
Using a two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach, we show that the increase in burglary is predicted by instrumenting economic variables such as local unemployment, median income and income inequality, and mean rent with the merger-generated change in bank concentration. The changes in homicide rates are less well explained by economic indicators and appear to be related to changing racial composition. We also find that the effect of mergers on crime rates is more severe in neighborhoods that already had greater income dispersion, more unemployment, and higher crime rates initially.
While we believe that this body of evidence suggests a plausible causal (though indirect) link from bank mergers to crime, a natural alternative theory for these results is reverse causation.
In considering the hypothesis that future crime increases are in some way prompting present-day mergers, we first note that commercial real estate loans are only a small part of banks' portfolios and, in any case, the future price effects we find correlated with mergers are small. Nonetheless, we investigate the hypothesis that some unobservable economic variables that affect future crime rates also motivate present-day bank mergers. We find that while bank mergers antedate increases in crime, increases in crime are not correlated with either contemporary or future bank mergers.
In addition, while we employ only non-failing banks for our merger variable, as a robustness test we also compute a change in concentration measure from the mergers of failing banks only, since these are the most likely to be associated with economic declines in the neighborhoods in which they operate. We find, however, that mergers between failing banks are not correlated with future crime. While difficult to reconcile with the reverse causation theory, this finding is consistent with mergers affecting competition, since the removal of a failing bank from the market probably has only a small competitive effect. In addition, examining only the mergers of very large (more than $1 billion in assets) banks, which almost certainly cannot be driven by the possibility of future neighborhood-level declines, we find these mergers do predict future increases in crime. Finally, when we consider mergers that should not affect the local competitive environment (for example when outsider banks acquire insider banks), such mergers do not predict increases in future crime.
This collection of results suggests the reverse causation theory is not highly plausible.
Although our analysis focuses on neighborhood (within county) variation in economic activity and crime, our final two sets of tests examine county and state level variation. At the county level, we show that increased bank mergers predict reduced construction activity, decreased police presence and criminal justice expenditure, and higher burglary and homicide rates. Drunk driving arrests, however, a crime that should not be positively correlated with income, is not affected by bank mergers.
For robustness, we also employ another measure of bank competition using variation in state deregulation of bank branching. In years immediately following deregulation of branching restrictions within a state, we find decreases in banking concentration, loan rate reduction, increasing loan provision, rising prices and real activity, and declining crime rates.
Our findings relate to the literature on the real effects of credit market imperfections. In a cross-country comparison, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that concentrated banking industries depress growth. Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) show that the declining position of Japanese banks in the 1990's led to significant reductions in construction activity and foreign direct investment in the U.S. Hancock and Wilcox (1997) demonstrate that the capital crunch of the early 1990's significantly reduced both commercial and residential real estate construction and sales. Black and Strahan (2002) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that new business incorporations and income growth followed U.S. branching deregulation. Burgess and Pande (2003) find evidence that the rural bank branch expansion program in India from 1977 to 1990 lowered rural poverty and increased non-agricultural ouput. Our results are also broadly consistent with the related literature on finance and development that suggests that a large financial sector is critical for fostering growth (King and Levine (1993) , Zingales (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) ). In contrast to this literature, we analyze micro-level variation in neighborhood credit markets and provide novel evidence on spillovers from credit market competitiveness to social outcomes such as crime.
Finally, our results link to the literature on urban development and crime. Cullen and Levitt (1999) tie crime to urban depopulation. Thaler (1978) finds that crime reduces house values. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) link house prices to the condition of local public finance. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002) show that crime increases with inequality. Freeman (1983) and Chiricos (1987) show that crime rises with unemployment. Levitt (1996 Levitt ( , 1997 Levitt ( , 1999 finds a positive relation between unemployment and property crimes. We are not aware of previous work connecting the degree of local financial access to changing crime rates. More broadly, the potential connection between finance and real activity and social outcomes is an intriguing area of further study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I details the commercial loan data, crime data, construction and Census data, and bank merger activity used to examine the real and social effects of financial access. Section II describes the empirical strategy we employ to exogenously measure changes in banking competitiveness through mergers. Section III analyzes the impact of a decrease in bank competition (through mergers) on subsequent loan rates and supply, economic and demographic variables, and crime rates. Section IV provides evidence on the exogeneity of the bank merger variable for predicting future crime. In Section V we conduct county and state level regressions and employ another exogenous measure of competition using state deregulation of bank branching. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Data and Summary Statistics
We briefly describe the variety of data sources used in the paper.
A. Transaction level data from the U.S. commercial real estate market Our sample consists of commercial real estate transactions drawn from across the U.S. over the period January 1, 1992 to March 30, 1999 from COMPS.com, a leading provider of commercial real estate sales data. COMPS collects data on commercial real estate transactions by contacting buyers, sellers, and brokers, and then confirms their reports with each of these parties. Moskowitz (2003a, 2003b) provide an extensive description of the COMPS database and detailed summary statistics. Of the 36,678 commercial real estate transactions reported over our sample period, 22,642 met our initial data requirements (i.e., recorded sale price, financing data, identities of principals, property location, and information on lenders). The data span 11 states: California, Nevada, Oregon, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, Georgia, New York, Illinois, and Colorado, plus the District of Columbia.
We group properties into three mutually exclusive types: apartments (defined as multi-family dwellings, apartment complexes, condominiums, and townhouses), vacant land, and commercial and industrial buildings. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics on the properties in our sample. The average (median) sale price is $2.4 million ($600,000). The majority of transacted properties are relatively small, though values range from $20,000 to $750 million, and are primarily not of larger portfolios of properties such as REITS, which comprise only 42 transactions total (less than 0.2 percent of the sample). Capitalization rates, defined as net income on the property divided by sale price, and property age are also reported. The mean, median, standard deviation, and extreme one percentiles are reported to gauge outliers.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the COMPS database, however, is the detailed information about specific property transactions. In particular, the data are well detailed with regard to property location, identity (and location) of market participants, and financial structure. For example, COMPS provides eight digit latitude and longitude coordinates of the property's location (accurate to within 10 meters). From these, we construct characteristics of the local market in which each property resides. This enables us to match each property with local crime rates as well as local Census statistics at as fine a level as the Census Block Group. We describe this briefly below.
A.1 Financial structure and terms
The COMPS data contain detailed financing information for each property transaction, particularly the extent of bank financing used in deals. We focus on the terms of the loan contract, including interest rates, and the size and presence of bank loans. As Panel A indicates, the average loan size as a fraction of sale price is over 75 percent and even the first percentile of properties with loans have at least 20 percent loan-to-value. The data also contain rich detail on loan terms. Of the 12,937 deals involving bank debt, 8,573 (roughly 2/3) have information about the interest rate charged on those loans. Panel A shows that loan rates average 8.28 percent over the entire sample and range from as low as 5 to 11.75 percent (per annum). Other details of the loan contract documented are the maturity of the loan, whether the loan rate is floating or fixed, whether amortized and the length of amortization, and whether the loan was subsidized by the Small Business Administration (occuring only 1.3 percent of the time).
B. Crime rate data
We augment the data from COMPS with crime rate data from CAP Index, Inc. CAP Index computes the crime score index for a particular location by combining geographic, economic, and population data with local police, victim, and loss reports. Specifically, data from police reports, the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR), client loss reports, and offender and victim surveys are combined to form a crime score. The combination of crime rate information from several sources allows for a richer and more geographically refined measure of crime than can be provided by the FBI's UCR, for instance. 2 CAP Index supplies crime scores to businesses looking to relocate or banks seeking automated teller machine locations. We then match each property's eight digit latitude and longitude coordinates (precise to within 10 meters) with the crime score index for those coordinates (provided by Cap Index). Hence, we obtain a property specific crime score, rather than a county average or coarser crime rate. This is particularly useful since we can match crime rates with particular property transactions and therefore particular financing characteristics associated with those transactions (such as borrowing rates). However, we also recognize that crime scores of individual properties will be highly correlated within a given area and deal with this issue in our econometric analysis.
The crime scores measure the probability that a certain crime will be committed in a given location relative to national and county levels of crime. For example, a crime score of 1 means that the likelihood of a particular crime being committed is the same in the location as the national (or county) average for that year. Crime scores range from 0.1 to 20. CAP Index scores the seven crimes listed in the FBI's UCR as Part 1 Offenses. These are homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The first four are classified as "crimes against persons" and the last three as "crimes against property." For brevity, and due to the high correlation among the various crime measures, we employ the homicide rate as a measure of personal crime risk and the burglary rate for property crime risk. The correlation between these two crime scores is less than 0.37, and results in the paper are robust to several other crime score measures. CAP Index provided crime scores at three points in time: 1990, 1995, and 2000 . We examine the changes in crime rates over the two periods before and after 1995.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that crime rates are on average higher than the national average (i.e., greater than 1) in the locations covered by the COMPS database. This is not surprising since COMPS covers commercial markets which are weighted toward larger cities and more metropolitan/populated areas. As the table indicates, however, there is substantial variation in crime rates across the property locations covered by COMPS.
We also supplement our analysis with county and state level crime rate data from the FBI's UCR for robustness. As Panel A of Table 1 indicates, the correlation between the nationally adjusted Cap Index crime rates and county level UCR rates is fairly high (0.37 for homicides and 0.56 for burglaries in 2000). However, the county-adjusted Cap Index rates are virtually uncorrelated with UCR county crime rates, providing finer geographic variation in crime within counties.
C. Census and construction data
We also augment our sample with Census Tract statistics on income distribution, median housing value, unemployment, and population levels, as well as construction data from 
D. Bank merger activity
Finally, since we employ bank mergers as an instrument for changes in bank competition in the local area (discussed in detail in the next section), we report summary statistics on bank merger activity over our sample period in Panel B of Table 1 reports statistics on non-failing commercial bank merger and acquisition activity in the COMPS database. There are 1,511 different banks making loans in our sample, of which 237 were involved in a merger at some point during the period 1992 to 1999. In terms of the number of loan transactions, mergers have an even larger influence in our sample. Panel B details the percentage of deals involving bank loans in our data set that are originated by banks involved in a merger. Of the 12,937 deals involving bank debt, 2,919 (or 22.5 percent) involved a bank that merged. The prevalence of loans made by banks that merged over our sample period is critical for our empirical strategy to identify exogenous changes in bank competition.
II. Using Bank Mergers to Measure Exogenous Competition Changes
We would like an exogenous measure of banking competition that is otherwise unrelated to any of our dependent variables (demand for financing, financing terms, prices, measures of real activity, and crime). Measuring changes in bank competition for commercial loans directly (e.g., changes in the concentration of bank market share with respect to commercial real estate loans) within a given area may be problematic since it is likely that the competitive environment will vary simultaneously with the performance of local real assets and local real activity. For instance, a decline in a district's property values might lead some banks to withdraw from lending activity in the now less profitable area. Such endogeneity problems will lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates, which are in general impossible to sign in a multivariate regression.
One approach to addressing the endogeneity problem is to try to satiate the regression with as many local market and property attributes as is available. We will add a set of controls which attempt to do this. In addition, we will employ lagged measures of competition to avoid simultaneity problems. However, unobservable differences in local real estate market conditions and property characteristics can also cause endogeneity problems that make detection of an effect difficult in the data. Moreover, if these effects are serially correlated, then lagged measures may not fully address the issue. Another approach is to use property fixed-effects estimation to difference out the unobservables. Since we do not have panel data in the sense that almost no properties appear multiple times in our sample, fixed-effects estimation is not possible. Therefore, we focus on identifying exogenous variation in banking competitiveness and employing instrumental variables techniques.
We use non-failing commercial bank merger activity to measure changes in bank competition that are otherwise uncorrelated with subsequent neighborhood-level variation in loan rates, prices, investment, and crime. Rhoades (2000) documents that mergers are the dominant source of changes in banking structure from 1980 to 1998 as the number of new chartered banks and bank failures is considerably smaller than the number of mergers (less than 2 percent of local market deposits).
Since we focus on non-failing banks exclusively, these mergers were not caused by insolvency. In addition, commercial real estate loans are a small fraction of most bank's balance sheets and our banks generally operate across multiple regions. In section IV we provide evidence that our bank merger variable is a valid instrument for competition.
For each property we compute a measure of bank competition using a local bank loan Herfindahl concentration index. More competitive bank markets are those with lower Herfindahl measures. 4 The local nature of the commercial real estate market dictates that the local (to be defined shortly) bank concentration index is the relevant measure. Survey data for households and small businesses demonstrate highly localized banking markets (see Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (2002) ). Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003a) find the commercial market to be highly localized due to information asymmetry. The Supreme Court has ruled that banking markets should be treated as local for antitrust review and litigation, which is what both the Fed and Department of Justice examine.
For any given property, j, irrespective of the date at which it was sold, we first calculate for each given year, yr, the actual concentration measure of bank loans for the local area in which the property resides. (j,yr,b) 1 where N (j,yr,b) is the set of properties within 15 miles of property j (excluding the property itself) which received a loan from bank b during year yr, and B j,yr is the set of distinct banks who made loans to a property within a 15 mile radius of property j in year yr.
We then compute a second measure of bank loan concentration BankHI merge j,yr using the merger activity data. Specifically, we recompute equation (1) assuming that all bank mergers that took place during the course of year yr actually occurred at the beginning of the year. This creates a hypothetical local bank concentration measure that treats future merged banks as a single entity in their previous deals. That is, if two banks merge during the year, we examine all of their deals before the merger and code them as coming from the same bank in that year. For example, if banks A and B merge in June 1994, we code all deals financed by A or B from January to June (i.e., before the merger) as coming from the same bank. We are thus measuring the hypothetical impact on banking concentration based on previous loans made before the merger and assuming that other banks do not change their market shares after the merger. Our measure underestimates the effect of the merger since the activity of the merged bank from June to December is included in BankHI actual j,yr , thus ignoring the decrease in competition caused by the merger from June to December.
The change in banking competitiveness from year yr 1 to yr 2 caused by mergers, ∆BankHI yr 1 :yr 2 , is then defined simply as the sum of the individual year increases in the Herfindahl measure, Treating all banks equally, this translates into a decrease in the number of banks in a local area due to mergers from an average of 19 to 16.5. Figure 1 , which plots the histogram of ∆BankHI measures indicates, however, that the majority of local banking markets experience little to no change in concentration, while a few experience substantial increases. The 90th percentile reduction in the number of banks is 8.5, which is fairly substantial. Similar measures are reported in Table 1 and Figure As a quick check for whether our merger variable predicts actual future changes in local bank concentration, we note that the correlation between predicted changes in concentration due to mergers from 1992 to 1995 , ∆BankHI 1992 :1995 , and the actual change in bank concentration from 1996 to 1998 is 0.24. Regressing the actual change in concentration on our merger variable (plus a host of controls including population, income, and housing value growth, property type and county dummies) yielded a significant coefficient of 2.95 with a t-statistic of 4.15.
III. Bank Mergers' Impact on Financial, Real, and Social Activity
In this section we examine the subsequent impact on financial, real, and social activity from restricted credit access as a result of decreased bank competition (from mergers).
A. Loan rates and Borrowing Activity
We begin by analyzing in Table 2 how the change in bank Herfindahl concentration measure generated through non-failing bank mergers (over various horizons) is linked to the loan rates, terms, and loan size of the property-specific transactions from the COMPS database.
We regress the interest rates on the loans in our commercial real estate transaction data set on ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear and a set of control variables that include the 1995 homicide rate and recent growth in homicide (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, defined as the cross-sectional variation of capitalization rates on all properties within 15 miles of the property (excluding the property itself), as well as growth in population, income, and median home value from 1990 to 2000 for the Census Tract in which the property resides (obtained from the Census Bureau). In addition, we include a set of loan attributes as regressors: the loan-to-value ratio, indicator variables for floating or fixed rates, whether the loan is backed by the Small Business Administration, and the length of amortization and loan maturity in years. All regressions include a constant, property type dummies (for land, apartments, and commercial and industrial buildings), and year and county fixed effects, which are omitted from the table for brevity. Regressions are run under OLS with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level.
The first column of Table 2 reports results from the loan rate regression. As the table indicates, when bank mergers increase the concentration of the local banking market the increase in loan rates is statistically significant but economically modest. For instance, if the change in bank concentration through mergers, ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear , increases by one standard deviation, this raises average loan rates at the margin by 18.5 basis points per annum. This small price effect associated with significant increases in market concentration is broadly consistent with previous results (Hannan (1997) and Sapienza (2002)). 5
While the loan price effects of an increase in bank concentration are not large, the quantity effects are economically larger. Column 2 reports results from the regression of the magnitude of bank debt as a fraction of the purchase price on ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear . Since borrowers can substitute cash or seller financing for bank debt, many of the dependent variable's observations are zero. Hence, we estimate this regression via tobit, with bootstrapped standard errors. The amount of bank debt significantly decreases when bank competition declines. A one standard deviation increase in bank concentration reduces the amount of bank debt by 1.1 percent. In Column 3 we estimate the probability of obtaining any bank debt using a probit model with bootstrapped standard errors. 6
As Column 3 indicates, borrowers receive bank financing less frequently when banking markets become less competitive. An increase of one standard deviation in bank concentration decreases the probability of bank debt being granted by 4.2 percent. The most economically significant effect of mergers, therefore, is a substantial reduction in the number of commercial real estate loans provided.
Consistent with this result, Sapienza (2002) finds that after mergers, banks engage in less small business lending. Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) and Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and
White (2000), however, show that merged banks' competitors increase their small business lending in response so that the net effect on small business lending is unclear. We can reconcile these findings with our results by considering the timing of our transactions. We measure the effect of the change in competition on loan rates over the period 1992 to the sale year of the property.
On average this is a 3.5 year period. We posit that a change in the regulatory or technological environment motivates two banks to merge. This merger then affects the competitive environment and results in higher loan rates and substantially fewer loans being provided. This short-term distortion of the market will typically provoke entry or loan supply increases by competing banks, but as Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) note, these competitive effects will require a minimum of three years to be realized. In the interim the loan market will perform inefficiently with a diminished level of financing, and this is the effect we are capturing.
To show that local competition largely affects smaller borrowers, the fourth column provides results on the effect of bank mergers on loan rates for the largest deals (property values of $10 million or higher). Borrowers in the largest deals will typically have access to a broader set of national banks and are thus less likely to be affected by changes in the competitiveness of the local banking market. The results show that an increase in local bank market concentration has a statistically insignificant effect on loan rates in the largest deals, as might be expected. The probability of bank debt being obtained in large deals is also not affected by mergers of local banks.
Finally, the sixth and seventh columns of Table 2 consider the effects on interest rates and loan provision of only mergers between two very large (over $1 billion in assets) banks. It is unlikely that neighborhood-level market conditions are motivating such mergers. These mergers have a very similar effect (increased loan rates and fewer loans) on future transactions to that of the larger set of all mergers.
B. Investment and development
We next analyze the potential real effects of the substantial decrease in the provision of bank debt associated with mergers.
The first two columns of Table 3 Panel A consider two proxies for the level of development in the 15 mile radius surrounding each property. In the first column we consider the change in mean age of properties and in the second the change in the fraction of properties less than 3 years old in this region (we exclude the property itself). The change in average age of properties sold in a local area indicates how much recent development has taken place in the area, since recently developed properties will be young by definition. The fraction of properties less than three years old compares the level of development from 1995 to 1998 to the level of development from 1992 to 1995. We regress these development variables on ∆BankHI 1992:1995 and the usual controls.
As the table indicates, the average age of properties rises significantly and the fraction of young/developed properties (less than three years old) declines significantly when local banking markets become less competitive. A one standard deviation increase in local bank concentration raises the mean age of properties by 1.51 years and generates a 0.7 percentage point decline in the fraction of properties less than three years of age. Since the mean age of properties is 35.55 and 9.97 percent of properties are below 3 years of age, a one standard deviation increase in concentration increases the mean age by 4.2 percent and decreases the fraction of properties less than three years by 7.0 percent. Since development projects are often the most marginal for banks, it is not surprising that the contraction in lending most affects investment in new properties. These results linking investment to well-functioning credit markets are consistent with the cross-country work of King and Levine (1993) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
C. Property prices and rents
Neighborhoods with less new development will age and become less attractive with time as properties depreciate. This may in turn impact local real estate market prices and rents.
Column 3 reports regression results of property prices on ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear . The dependent variable is the property capitalization rate (net operating income divided by price). The measure ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear is appropriate for this test since we are considering property prices reported in the year of the sale. We include the standard controls from previous regressions.
The regression demonstrates that cap rates increase significantly, or prices per unit of income decrease significantly, when the banking market becomes more concentrated. A one standard deviation increase in ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear generates about a 0.10 percentage point increase in cap rates, which implies a 1 percent decrease in property prices (the mean cap rate of 10.09 percent is given in Table 1 ). Given the mean property value in our sample is $2,387,000, this translates roughly into a $23,870 decline.
The fourth column considers the change in mean gross rent from 1990 to 2000 in the Census
Tract in which the property resides. We regress this variable on the increase in bank concentration over our entire sample period, ∆BankHI 1992:1999 . We find that increased bank concentration is significantly associated with a decline in rents; a one standard deviation increase in bank concentration due to mergers reduces average rents by $173.
The fifth column in Panel A presents results from regressing total vacancy and rental rates on bank concentration and finds a significant positive relationship. This shows that home ownership rates decline as bank concentration increases.
Taken together the results in Table 3 Panel A show a general local deterioration following increased bank concentration, as real estate investment declines, reducing property values and rents, and generating lower levels of home ownership.
D. Household income and racial distribution
We next consider the effects of declining rents and property prices on the income distribution and racial composition of the neighborhood. In the first column of 
E. Crime
There is substantial evidence in the economics of crime literature of a positive relationship between unemployment and crime (e.g., Freeman (1999) and Freeman and Rodgers (1999) ), though the association is not particularly strong (e.g., Cullen and Levitt (1999) ). Grogger (1998) and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) present clear evidence linking low legal wage opportunities to increased crime. Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990) , Kelly (2000) , Donohue and Levitt (2001) , and Grogger (1998) document a correlation between race and crime. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002) document that crime increases with economic inequality. Given the results in Table 3 that increases in bank concentration lead to less development, declining rents, an influx of poorer households, in-migration of African-Americans, and rising income inequality, this suggests a potential causal connection between bank mergers and increased crime. Moreover, given potential social interaction multiplier effects (e.g., Scheinkman (1996, 2002) ) the effect on crime could be significant. In Table 4 we examine, therefore, how both the homicide rate (a measure of personal crime) and burglary rate (a measure of property crime) change when banking markets become less competitive through non-failing bank mergers.
The dependent variable in the first three columns of These results are highly statistically significant and control for both the current level and previous change in crime (which appear to be important and are discussed below). Hence, when mergers cause the local banking market to consolidate and become less competitive, there is a subsequent rise in both homicides and burglaries over the next several years. is −0.24), the effect of mergers was still to increase the 1995 to 2000 change in crime risk.
Since the link we propose between bank competition and burglary is through an economic mechanism tying bank mergers to higher loan rates, lower price and rent levels, and greater unemployment and migration of poorer households, we run instrumental variable regressions using two-stage least squares (2SLS) of the change in burglary risk on instrumented economic variables using our merger concentration variable as an instrument. We report the results in Table 4 Panel B. Consistent with the economic mechanism described, the instrumented changes in loan rates, unemployment, race migration, income, income dispersion, mean rents, and income migration all have a strong effect on burglary rates. The economic mechanism appears to be less important in explaining the rise in homicide; the primary link between bank competition and subsequent increases in homicide risk appears to arise from racial migration. In the 2SLS regression of the change in homicide risk on instrumented racial migration (not reported), we find a coefficient of 7.383 with a t-statistic of 3.13.
E.1 Cross-sectional local crime changes
In Table 5 we consider differences across neighborhoods in the effect of a merger-induced increase in bank concentration on burglary. A priori it seems reasonable to argue that the poorest neighborhoods will be most affected by a given increase in bank concentration since the provision of finance in these neighborhoods may already be restricted. We regress the change in burglary risk from 1995 to 2000 on ∆BankHI 1992:1995 , ∆BankHI 1992:1995 interacted with other variables, and the controls from Table 4 . In the first column of the table we show that an increase in ∆BankHI 1992:1995 has the greatest effect in increasing crime in neighborhoods that previously had higher bank concentrations in 1992 to 1995. An increase in bank concentration also has a greater effect in neighborhoods that experienced in 1990 greater income dispersion, higher crime levels, and more unemployment.
The interaction term with mean rent is negative, but insignificant. These results suggest that more fragile neighborhoods already experiencing economic decline and high crime risk are most affected by an increase in bank concentration arising from mergers.
As an additional test, we consider a different econometric model of the correlations in crime rates among neighboring properties. Rather than considering county fixed effects and adjusting for cross-correlations within zip codes, we explicitly model crime as a function of merger activity and the controls in a simultaneous spatial autoregression (SAR) model (see Pace, Barry, and Sirmans (1998) 
E.2 The economic impact of crime
The magnitude of the crime effects we document are in line with those in the literature. For instance, Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) and Lee (1993) find a point increase in unemployment raised property crimes by 2.2%. Freeman and Rodgers (1999) report an elasticity of crime to unemployment of 1.5%. Grogger (1997) estimates an elasticity of crime to wages of 0.6-0.9.
To put our crime rate results into perspective, consider the number of homicides and burglaries that also presumably rise with burglaries. More importantly, this figure does not account for the indirect pecuniary costs of crime such as added security or decreased savings and spending. Nor does it account for the disutility of crime, increased anxiety, or decreased social activity that may occur. (See Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) ). Levitt (1997) estimates that the cost of pain, suffering, and economic loss for the average crime is around $3,000, more than doubling the loss of property estimate above. Clearly, a 1 percent rise in crime may have significant wealth and utility consequences resulting from both real and social effects.
IV. Exogeneity of Competition Measure
We now provide further evidence on the exogeneity of the bank merger variable, particularly with regard to crime.
A. Does (whatever drives) future crime spur present-day mergers?
The regression results in Tables 4 and 5 point to a link between bank competition/financial access and crime. Moreover, we have been careful to link bank merger activity to subsequent increases in crime and loan rates. One interpretation of this link is a causal one, namely that declines in loan access lead to subsequent increases in crime. The leading alternative theory for these correlations, however, is reverse causation, namely that whatever unobservable variables affect future crime drive present-day mergers. More precisely, local economic conditions affecting future crime rates may also drive banks to merge in anticipation of these effects. One version of the reverse causation theory is that banks in declining neighborhoods may anticipate further deterioration in their future lending positions. Concerned about their viability or falling below minimum efficient scale, the banks may seek mergers. A second version is that banks in declining neighborhoods may understand that the equilibrium level of competition in such neighborhoods is likely to decline in the future as the profitability of the neighborhoods decline. Banks may therefore merge today to reduce future competition in these neighborhoods.
We believe that the reverse causal interpretation of our results is less plausible for several reasons. First, commercial real estate loans typically comprise a small portion of a bank's balance sheet. For example, the FDIC's History of the Eighties -Lessons for the Future (p. 159) documents that among non-failing banks, commercial real estate loans were 11 percent of assets in 1993. Over the entire 1992 to 1999 period, the Federal Reserve estimates that total real estate loans (commercial and residential) comprised less than 13 percent of assets. Since we only consider non-failing mergers, and since commercial real estate loans are a small fraction of bank assets, it is unlikely that changes in commercial property values or commercial real estate lending is driving the mergers we study.
Moreover, in Table 3 we showed that merger activity one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a less than 1 percent decrease in property values. The effect on commercial real estate loans is even smaller. Given the small fraction that commercial real estate loans represent of total bank assets it is difficult to argue that banks are merging in anticipation of future decreases in property values and increases in crime. Second, we include county fixed effects in our analysis.
It seems unlikely that bank mergers are motivated by neighborhood-level variation within counties in current or anticipated future crime rates and commercial real estate prices. Third, in Section V we employ state branching deregulation as an additional instrument for competition and find very similar results to those obtained from our merger variable.
To provide clear evidence for or against the reverse causation theory we test several of its implications. First, if trending crime rates cause mergers, future crime would have to be a reflection of the current crime trend; in essence, current crime would be spurring contemporaneous bank mergers. We note that the recent change in crime (from 1990 to 1995) is positively correlated with future changes in crime (from 1995 to 2000). Hence, under this alternative hypothesis we should see a significant positive contemporaneous correlation between mergers and crime in the period 1990
to 1995. As the first two columns of Table 6 Panel A indicate, however, we find no such relation in the data. The contemporaneous correlation between homicide and our merger variable is negative and between burglaries and mergers is statistically no different from zero.
We also examine in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 Panel A whether the level and change in crime predict future actual bank concentration (this captures the effects of both mergers and consolidation for other reasons). Both homicide and burglary levels and changes fail to predict future bank consolidation. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 Panel A we address whether crime predicts merger activity. We regress the probability of a merger of any bank active in a property's neighborhood (linear probability model) on the 1995 level and 1990 to 1995 change in crime. All the effects are negative, with the change in homicide risk and level of burglary risk both predicting significantly fewer mergers.
The results in Table 4 show that bank mergers are associated with future increases in crime. The results in Table 6 Panel A show that increases in crime are associated with neither contemporaneous nor future bank mergers. This is difficult to explain under the reverse causation hypothesis.
B. Using subsets of bank mergers to predict future crime
Although our merger variable is constructed from only mergers between non-failing commercial banks, in Table 6 Panel B columns 1 and 2 we consider the effects of mergers that involve failing banks exclusively (these are mergers requiring assistance from either the FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state or other regulatory agency). If bank mergers increase subsequent crime rates due to a competitive effect, then these assisted mergers should have little impact on future crime. Failing banks are likely not providing much competition for other banks before the merger so their removal from the market should not typically have a significant effect. On the other hand, if the association between bank mergers and future crime arises from mergers of weak banks in declining neighborhoods (reverse causality), then the effect should be strongest for these assisted mergers, since failing banks are more likely to be active in declining neighborhoods. Our data contain an additional 106 failing banks who merged in our sample. We recompute the bank merger concentration measure using these banks only and regress future crime risk changes on it. We find an insignificant (and negative) coefficient for both homicide and burglary, contradicting the reverse causal story and providing further support for a causal link from non-failing bank mergers to future crime.
For further robustness, Table 6 Panel B columns 3 and 4 present evidence on the crime effects of mergers between two large (assets greater than $1 billion) banks. Large banks operate in many neighborhoods, so the average neighborhood effect for these banks (controlling for county effects)
is likely to be quite small, by the law of large numbers. That is, cross-neighborhood variation in real estate prices and crime is very unlikely to motivate the mergers of large banks. Nonetheless, even with our smaller sample of mergers between two large banks, we find the same positive effects of mergers on future crime.
C. Separating the merger effect from the competition effect
As an additional test of the robustness of our instrument, we separate the effect of the merger per se from the effect of reduced competition caused by mergers. Specifically, we augment our ∆BankHI measure with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a merger took place in the local banking market and zero otherwise. The dummy variable contrasts local markets where a merger took place with those where one did not, making no distinction between the potential impact of the merger on competition using prior bank concentration information.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the effect of the merger itself (the dummy variable) on loan rates, loan provision, and crime rates. The same control regressors and standard error calculations employed in the previous tables are used. Both statistically and economically, the merger itself has no effect on loan rates or homicide rates. The effect on burglary rates is negative, and the effect on loan frequency is positive, inconsistent with reverse causality. The coefficients on ∆BankHI show that it is the extent of the diminution in competition, not the fact of the merger, that predicts higher loan rates, less frequent bank financing, and increased crime in the future.
Panel B reports results using the merger dummy conditional on ∆BankHI = 0. This considers all mergers in which outsider banks purchase an insider bank operating in a neighborhood, where the ex ante expected change in local bank concentration is zero. Hence, there should be little effect from local competition associated with these mergers. On the other hand, if mergers are motivated by declining prices and increasing crime rates, then these outsider-insider mergers should be associated with future crime increases and loan provision decreases. As the results detail, mergers in which outsider banks acquire insider banks are associated with moderately less crime and more bank loans, which is inconsistent with the reverse causation hypothesis.
We have shown that crime increases are not correlated with contemporaneous or future bank mergers. Failing-bank mergers, which should be expected to most affect declining neighborhoods, are not associated with future increases in crime risk. Bank mergers of large banks, which are very unlikely to be driven by neighborhood-level effects, are associated with future increases in crime. It is the decrease in competition not the fact of the merger that predicts future crime increases, and mergers between outsider and insider banks are not correlated with futures rises in crime. In the face of this collection of evidence, the contention that banks are merging in anticipation of future neighborhood-level decline strikes us as not very plausible.
V. County and State Level Regressions
For robustness, we supplement our neighborhood-level evidence with county and state level evidence from bank competition. This provides an additional test of our hypothesis, additional variables not available at the neighborhood level, and out of sample evidence on crime from another data source and over another time period. In addition, state level data allow for the use of another exogenous measure of competition using state branching regulation.
A. County Level Construction and Crime
We consider the effects of bank mergers on investment and crime data at a county level. While migration is likely to be less important at the county level than at the neighborhood level, a mergerinduced constriction of credit should still have implications for construction and crime at the county level. One advantage of using county-level data is that explicit construction estimates are available.
We are also able to use the FBI UCR at the county level to compare to the Cap Index crime scores.
This provides further robustness.
In the first two columns of The results show that increased merger activity in 1992 to 1995 strongly predicts a reduction in both the number of construction companies and construction employees in the subsequent period. Levitt (2001) and were graciously supplied by the authors.
The first two columns of Panel B employ the number of arresting officers (officials with arresting powers) per capita and county expenditure on the criminal justice system (police force, corrections, and judicial and legal activities) per capita, respectively, as dependent variables. We find that the number of arresting officers and the expenditures on the criminal justice system both decrease with increases in bank concentration. The next three columns employ crime rates from the UCR as dependent variables. The number of reported homicides and burglaries per capita both increase with bank concentration, even after controlling for the lagged abortion and imprisonment rates, both of which have been shown to capture substantial variation in crime (Levitt (1996) , Donohue and Levitt (2001) ). This is consistent with our previous evidence from neighborhood-level regressions using CAP Index data. Finally, we also examine the number of DUI (driving under the influence)
arrests per capita, since this is a crime that is likely not positively associated with income (since cars and liquor are both normal goods). If the link from bank mergers to crime is through an income mechanism as we conjecture, then we would not expect a positive effect on DUI arrests. As the last column of Panel B confirms, the effect on DUI is negative and insignificant.
B. State Branching Deregulation
As a final test we employ another exogenous measure for changing bank competition using state variation in bank branching regulation. Black and Strahan (2002) The first column of Panel A of Table 9 reports results from regressions of local bank concentration on unrestricted branching in a state. The usual controls for each regression apply, but standard errors are calculated assuming group-wise clustering at the state and year level. As the table indicates, unrestricted branching decreases subsequent bank concentration levels in neighborhoods.
Hence, deregulation seems to increase competition. The next three columns examine the impact of deregulation on loan rates, loan provision, and prices. Consistent with our earlier findings, loan rates decrease with competition and loan frequency and prices increase with competition. The magnitude of the effects is smaller though similar to those obtained via the merger variable for competition.
In Panel B, we examine crime rates at the state level in conjunction with branching deregulation.
Since we are using state branching deregulation and crime rate data at the state level from the FBI's UCR, we are no longer restricted to the COMPS database. Thus, we employ crime rate data from all 50 states plus the District of Columbia over the extended period 1978 to 2001. 8 This also allows us to employ a richer (both cross-sectionally and time-series wise) state bank branching measure since states adopted unrestricted branching throughout the 1970's, 80's, and 90's. Moreover, this
provides an out of sample test of our hypothesis using new data from new regions and time periods.
The dependent variable in Panel B is the year-to-year change in crime (reported homicides and burglaries per capita) from year t − 1 to year t, regressed on a post unrestricted branching indicator which takes on the value one if the state adopted unrestricted branching within the last five years.
Other control regressors include the lagged annual change from year t − 2 to year t − 1 in state population, employment per capita, social services employees per capita, income, and imprisonment rate. We also employ the lagged annual change in the state abortion rate from 16 years ago (i.e., from t − 17 to t − 16) as an additional regressor. Due to data limitations, regressions that include the lagged abortion rate begin in 1987. Because we are interested in cross-sectional differences in changes in crime rates across states, this is why we examine first differences in our regressions.
Furthermore, because we focus on cross-sectional differences in differences, we run the regressions in the style of Fama and MacBeth (1973) , where each year a cross-sectional regression (across the 51 jurisdictions) is run and the time-series average of the yearly cross-sectional coefficient estimates and their associated time-series standard errors are calculated. This procedure ignores time-series variation, focusing exclusively on the cross-section. More importantly, standard errors are robust to cross-correlation in the residual (due to year or other effects). 9
As Panel B of Table 9 indicates, the post state branching variable has a significant negative effect on crime, with point estimates of small, though similar, magnitude to those obtained from our merger variable in the COMPS sample. The effect on burglary is stronger than that on homicide, which only becomes significant once we control for the lagged change in abortion rate. These findings, on a new data set, over a different sample period, across all states, and using a new exogenous measure of competition, bolster our contention of a link between credit market competitiveness,
8 Although crime rate data goes back to 1960, many of the control variables we employ, such as state income and social services employees, date back only to 1977. Since we regress changes in crime on lagged changes in these variables, the sample starts in 1978.
9 The Fama-MacBeth procedure produces conservative standard errors by allowing anything that drives variation in the year-to-year coefficient estimates to show up in the standard error. This effectively ignores any cross-sectional residual correlation from the yearly regressions, resulting in robust standard errors. For further detail regarding this method and its merits see Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Cochrane (2001) . real activity, and social outcomes such as crime.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that the neighborhoods most affected by bank mergers subsequently experience significantly worse credit terms, less development and investment, lower real estate prices and rents, an inflow of poorer and disadvantaged households, and greater increases in crime in subsequent years. These results are confirmed by our finding that state branching deregulation leads to less future crime. We show that credit market imperfections can have important spillover effects on economic and social outcomes.
Our work suggests that in evaluating the impact of bank mergers, regulators would do well to consider not only the present bank concentration of potentially affected markets, but also the social fragility of these markets. It is the neighborhoods that already suffer from high crime rates that experience the greatest increase in crime after a merger-induced reduction in banking competition.
It would be reasonable, therefore, to apply greater scrutiny to mergers affecting low-income and high-crime areas.
We propose and provide evidence on one simple mechanism connecting crime and real activity to the market for finance, but a more general link between financial access, development, and social outcomes may be worth pursuing. If, as has been shown here and by others, inefficient loan markets retard development, then a range of economic and social issues including, for example, education and health care might be connected to the availability of finance. Future research may carefully consider the broader role of competitive and well-functioning credit markets in fostering economic development and social harmony. Panel A reports the distributional characteristics of the property transactions in the COMPS database as well as local crime rates over the period January 1, 1992 to March 30, 1999. The mean, median, standard deviation, and one and 99 percentiles of sale price, capitalization rate (net operating income divided by sales price), property age, loan size (loan-to-value), loan interest rate, and loan maturity are reported. Also reported are local crime index scores at three points in time (1990, 1995, and 2000) for crimes against person (homicide) and property (burglary) for the location in which the property resides. Crime scores relative to their national and county averages are obtained from CAP Index, Inc. Correlations between the Cap Index crime rates and the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) crime rates (reported number of crimes per capita) are also reported. Panel B reports statistics of non-failing bank merger and acquisition activity (obtained from the Federal Reserve) involved in deals covered by COMPS. The means and standard deviations of the actual Herfindahl concentration index of commercial real estate bank loans within 15 miles of the property (excluding the property itself), BankHI actual , and the difference between this and the hypothetical concentration index assuming all bank mergers took place at the beginning of each year summed from year yr 1 to year yr 2 , ∆BankHI yr 1 :yr 2 , are reported. The loan rate and amount of debt of each property are regressed on a measure of changing local bank competition, using non-failing bank mergers from the Federal Reserve. The change in local bank competition caused by mergers, ∆BankHI 1992:Saleyear , is the sum of the individual year differences in the actual Herfindahl concentration index of commercial real estate bank loans within 15 miles of a property (excluding the property itself) and the hypothetical concentration index assuming all bank mergers took place at the beginning of each year, summed from 1992 to the year in which the property sold. Loan rate regressions are repeated for only the largest deals (property value of at least $10 million) and using only large bank (assets greater than $1 billion) mergers to measure competition changes. The amount of bank debt (estimated via tobit) and probability of bank debt (estimated via probit) are reported. Regressions include the current crime rate and recent change in crime, local price variation (cross-sectional variation of capitalization rates on properties within 15 miles), recent growth in population, income, and home value for the Census Tract in which the property resides (from the 1990 to 2000 Census), as well as loan attributes: loan-to-value ratio, an indicator for floating rate, an indicator for whether the loan is backed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), the length of amortization, and loan maturity. A constant, property type dummies (for land, apartments, and commercial and industrial buildings), and year and county dummies are also included, but are omitted from the table for brevity. Coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level under OLS and bootstrapped standard errors for the tobit and probit models. Panel A reports regression results of real investment proxies, property prices (cap rates, net income divided by sale price), and changes from 1990 to 2000 in Census Tract level average rents and rental and vacancy rates on changing local bank competition measured through mergers. Panel B reports regression results of changes in Census Tract level median income, income and race migration (the ratio of income and race of households who moved into the tract within the last five years over the income and race of households who have resided in the tract at least five years), unemployment, and income dispersion (the fraction of households with income greater than $150,000 minus the fraction with income less than $15,000) on changing local bank competition, measured through mergers. Changes in local bank competition from year yr 1 to yr 2 caused by mergers, ∆BankHI yr 1 :yr 2 , is the sum of the yearly difference between the actual Herfindahl concentration index of commercial real estate bank loans within 15 miles of a property (excluding the property itself) and the hypothetical concentration index assuming all bank mergers took place at the beginning of each year. All regressions include a constant, the current crime rate (1995) and recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995) , local price variation, recent growth in population, income, and home value for the Census Tract in which the property resides, property type dummies, and county dummies, which are omitted from the table for brevity. The cap rate regression also includes year dummies (not reported for brevity). Coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level for cap rate and age regressions and at the Census Tract level for the Census statistics regressions. The percentage change in future crime rates (homicide and burglary from 1995 to 2000) for the eight digit latitude and longitude location in which each property resides is regressed on the change in local bank competition from 1992 to 1995 caused by mergers, ∆BankHI 1992:1995 , defined as the sum of the individual year differences in concentration between the actual Herfindahl index of commercial real estate bank loans within 15 miles of a property (excluding the property itself) and the hypothetical concentration index assuming all bank mergers took place at the beginning of each year. Panel A reports results of crime rate changes directly on the merger variable, and Panel B reports results from two-stage least squares of crime rate changes on instrumental variables for loan rates, unemployment, income, rent, and income and race migration, where the merger competition variable is used to instrument for these variables in a first-stage regression. Regressions in both panels include the current crime rate (1995) and recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, and recent growth in population, income, and home value for the Census Tract in which the property resides (not reported in Panel B). A constant, property type dummies, and county dummies are also included but not reported. Coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level. Panel A reports results from tests of whether crime predicts bank consolidation. The first two columns report results from regressions of the percentage change in the current crime rate (homicide and burglary) from 1990 to 1995 for the eight digit latitude and longitude location in which the property resides, on the contemporaneous bank merger variable for local bank concentration, created only from non-failing bank mergers. Columns 3 and 4 report regression results of the actual future change in banking concentration on past crime levels and recent change in crime rates (from 1990 to 1995 for both homicide and burglaries). Columns 5 and 6 report regression results of the probability of a merger on past crime levels and recent change in crime rates (from 1990 to 1995 for both homicide and burglaries). Panel B reports results from regressions of future changes in crime (from 1995 to 2000 for both homicides and burglaries) on bank merger variables created from various subsets of bank mergers. The first two columns employ only bank mergers involving a failing bank, defined as a merger requiring assistance from either the FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state or other regulatory agency. Columns 3 and 4 employ only large bank mergers (greater than $1 billion in assets). All regressions include a constant, the current crime rate (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, recent growth in population, income, and home value for the Census Tract in which the property resides, and county dummies. Coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level. The loan rate, loan frequency, and crime regressions on the local banking competitiveness measures using non-failing bank mergers from the previous tables are repeated for two specifications. Panel A adds a dummy variable for the presence of a merger as an additional regressor to separate the merger effect from the competition effect. Panel B repeats the regressions on the merger dummy alone for only those properties residing in an area where the continuous measure ∆BankHI 1992:1995 is zero (e.g., no predicted effect on local banking competition). Here, the merger dummy captures the effect of an outside bank acquirer, where the ex ante expected change in local bank concentration is zero versus areas where no bank mergers took place. All regressions include a constant, the current crime rate (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995) , recent growth in population, income, and home value, and property type and county dummies. Loan rate and frequency regressions include the loan attributes from Panel A employs commercial property transaction level data from COMPS from 1992 to 1999. Regressions of the local bank concentration level, loan rate, loan frequency (probability of a bank loan), and capitalization rate of properties on the number of years since the state first allowed unrestricted branching (takes on the value zero if the state had yet to institute unrestricted branching at the time of the property sale) are reported. Regressions include a constant, the current crime rate (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995) , recent growth in population, income, and home value for the Census Tract in which the property resides, and property type dummies. Loan rate regressions also include the loan attributes from Table 2 . Coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the state and year level. Panel B employs state-level data on crime rates (reported homicides and burglaries per 1,000 people) from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports from 1978 to 2001. The year-to-year percentage changes in crime rates are regressed on a state level bank branching indicator which takes on the value one if the state had adopted unrestricted branching within the last five years. Regressions also include a constant, the one year lagged change in state population, employment, social services (the number of social service employees per capita), income, and imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per capita), as well as the 16 year lagged change in the state abortion rate (×1, 000), which is the change in the number of abortions (16 years 
